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PRICES AND SHORTAGES: EVALUATING POLICY OPTIONS FOR THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
1. Introduction
Over the last thirty years, natural gas has become an increasingly impor-
tant source of energy in the United States. Between 1945 and 1970 natural gas
production and consumption increased by 450%, from 4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)
per year to 22 Tcf per year, and as a share of total energy consumption, natural
gas rose from 12% to about 33%. Natural gas became the major fuel for home
heating; for the U.S. as a whole, it now accounts for over 40% of residential
energy consumption, and in some regions of the country, the fraction is much
greater. And because gas prices have been maintained at low levels, this fuel
has increasingly become the choice of electric utilities and large industrial
consumers. This, of course, is not surprising; gas has been clean, convenient,
and most of all cheap.
Between 1970 and the present, the demand for natural gas has continued to
grow at an average annual rate of 5.3%. Production, however, ceased growing in
1970, and began declining in 1972. The result has been a growing shortage. This
shortage began in 1971, when some industrial consumers found their non-inter-
ruptable ("firm") contracts being interrupted. By 1973 it was no longer possible
to have gas lines installed in new homes built in many regions of the country,
and a larger number of industrial consumers found their supplies curtailed. The
Federal Power Commission and the Federal Energy Administration predicted serious
shortages for the Winter of 1975-1976, and the Congress considered proposals
for allocating natural gas in case these shortages occurred. That winter was
iIn fact the FPC found production to be 3.7% below demand in 1971. Among those
consumers who were curtailed were farmers who used natural gas to dry their
newly harvested grain, which resulted in grain that could not be dried quickly
enough and rotted.
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mild, so the actual shortage was only about 2.5 Tcf (10% of total demand), but
the following winter was particularly severe, and large shortages materialized.
By the FPC's own reckoning, curtailments nationwide were 23% of "firm" require-
ments, and the shortage was particularly severe in several states. Aside from
the direct cost of unfulfilled demand, the shortage resulted in additional
unemployment of about one million people during the month of January, and over
$4 billion of lost GNP.
The direct cause of this shortage has been price regulation by the Federal
Power Commission. By maintaining an artificially low price, the FPC made natural
gas the choice fuel (for those consumers who could obtain it), so that demand
grew rapidly. At the same time, low prices depressed supplies. This occurred
for two reasons. First, the incentive was removed for the exploration and dis-
covery of new natural gas reserves, and as a result total U.S reserves of gas
fell by about a third between 1967 and 1976. This dwindling reserve base made
it impossible for producers to satisfy the demand for new long-term contracts.
Second, low prices removed the incentive to produce gas out of existing higher
cost reserves, so that production fell even with respect to a particular level
of reserves. This situation of rapid growth in demand combined with dwindling
supplies can only grow worse if recent policies of price regulation are continued.
How did we manage to institute this system of price controls, given that
it has resulted in shortages? The FPC was originally authorized by the Natural
Gat Act of 1938 to regulate the transport charges of the interstate pipeline
companies (which indeed have considerable monopoly power in several regional
consumption markets). But the scope of the Act was unclear, and as prices paid
by gas consumers began increasing, pressure was brought on the FPC to extend
controls to wellhead prices. The FPC refused to extend its jurisdiction until
r,
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1954, when the Supreme Court, in the Phillips Decision, ordered it to regulate
2
the prices of gas sold to the interstate pipelines.
The FPC first attempted to regulate wellhead prices following the practices
of state public utility commissions, i.e. by choosing an allowed rate of return
on capital, and then determining the price that would equate revenues with
the sum of operating costs, depreciation, and the allowed rate of return applied
to undepreciated capital. However this approach resulted in wellhead prices
nearly doubling between 1954 and 1959, and the.FPC becoming bogged down in a
backlog of cases. As a result, the FPC turned to area-wide price ceilings that
were based on regional average accounting costs. The result was that wellhead
prices were essentially frozen after 1960. The average new contract price was
18.2¢ per thousand cubic feet (mcf) in 1961, and only rose to 19.8¢ per mcf in
1969, and the average wholesale price paid by utilities only rose from 32¢ per
mcf to about 33.2. Wliolesale oil and coal prices, on the other hand, increased
by 15% and 22% respectively during this period.
After shortages began occurring in 1971, the FPC ended its price freeze,
and in a series of rate decisions allowed new contract prices to rise.4 By
1972 average new contract prices had increased to 33.6¢ per mcf, although with
considerable regional variation. In July, 1975, the FPC announced a uniform
2This case against the Phillips Petroleum Company, brought by the Attorney General
of Wisconsin, was based on the argument that although the pipelines were regulated,
wellhead price increases by large petroleum companies could be passed through as
"costs" in pipeline wholesale prices, thereby increasing retail prices to the con-
sumers. The Supreme Court, although not claiming that gas producers had monopoly
power, did find that the FPC should regulate wellhead prices. Fdr further dis-
cussion, see P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck, The Economics of the Natural Gas
Shortage (1960-1980), pages 12-14.
3Price ceilings forced producers to limit exploratory effort to low cost drilling
projects - which in turn maintained low price ceilings. See MacAvoy and Pindyck,
op cit, pages 14-16.
4 For a discussion of these decisions, and estimates-of what free market new contract
prices would likely have been, see P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck, Price Controls
and the Natural Gas Shortage, American Enterprise Institute, 1975, pages 15-19,
and P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck, The Economics of the Natural Gas Shortage
(1960-1980), North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam,· 1975, pages 17-21.
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"National area rate" of 42¢ per mcf; this rate was raised by the FPC to 51¢ in
November 1975, and cost-justified price increases were to be allowed in future
years. In fact new contract prices averaged about 55¢ in 1974 and 60¢ in 1975,
because of allowances by the FPC. While these prices are about three times those
prevailing in 1969, they are still grossly below the true value of natural
gas. In terms of barrels of oil-equivalent, the world price of energy in 1975
was about $12 per barrel, but 60¢ gas is equivalent (in thermal content) to oil
at $3.50 per barrel. Thus the price increases that occurred up to and including
1975 were not sufficient to bring the price of natural gas anywhere near its
free market level.
In order to avert extreme shortages, the wellhead. price of gas had to be
increased significantly. Congress failed to pass legislation to deregulate
natural gas prices, but instead considered various emergency allocation schemes
to deal with the shortages that they recognized were inevitable. Fortunately
the FPC took a step in the right direction in June 1976 when it announced in
Opinion 770, that the National.area rate for new contracts would be nearly tripled
to $1.42 per mcf, with future price increases of 4 per annum. This decision
was immediately challenged in the courts, leaving the effective price of natural
gas in doubt for about a year. However, on June 16, 1977 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia unanimously upheld the FPC decision.6 Thus
the new contract price in 1977 will average about $1.46 per mcf.
5A House bill and a related Administration proposal would have allowed interstate
pipelines to purchase gas in intrastate markets if the consuming areas served
by those pipelines were expected to have significant curtailments. In the Adminis-
tration proposal, pipelines would have paid whatever free market prices prevailed
in the intrastate market, and this higher price gas would be "rolled in" with the
lower interstate prices. The House bill (H.R. 9464) would have placed a ceiling
on the intrastate price. For estimates of the probable impact of such a plan on
interstate and intrastate gas markets, see R.S. Pindyck, "Emergency Proposals to
Deal with the Natural Gas Shortage," testimony before the House Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Sept. 24, 1975.
6American Public Gas Association et al. vs. FPC, Decision 76-2000. The Consumer
Federation of America may appeal the decision further, but except for the Phillips
decision, the Supreme Court has in the past supported FPC authority and methodology
in establishing natural gas prices.
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Unfortunately the new FPC area rates still. do not go far enough in bring-
ing natural gas prices up to free market levels. Natural gas at $1.46, for
example, is equivalent to oil at about $8.50 per barrel, again well below the
world market price. Also, 4 per annum price increases will result in natural
gas prices falling in real terms (unless the aggregate'rate of inflation drops
below 3%, which is unlikely). As a result, we will continue to be threatened
by natural gas shortages. There is thus' a pressing need to revise our natural
gas policy.
It is important to recognize that any natural gas policy involves a trade-
off between two evils - higher prices to consumers, and growing shortages.
Evaluating any particular policy thus requires estimating the magnitudes and ef-
fects of higher prices, and the magnitudes and effects of.shortages, that are
likely to result. In the next two sections we will use a detailed econometric
model of the natural gas industry developed at M.I.T. to project the effects'
on prices and on shortages through 1985 of three alternative natural gas policies:
a continuation of current FPC National area rates, President'Carter's plan to
increase new contract-wellhead prices of "new" gas and tax industrial consumers
of gas, and a plan of phased deregulation in which new contract prices would
be raised in steps towards their free market level. In Section 4 we evaluate
these three policies by estimating and comparing the costs of higher prices and
the costs of shortages for each. This will.provide us with a basis for deter-
mining a preferred policy.
2. What is at Stake - Higher Prices
It is not surprising that this country's natural gas .policy (and for that.
matter, its entire energy policy) has been dominated by a desire to hold down
prices. Policy makers are not ignorant of the simple economics of supply and de.-
mand (although they may have underestimated the impact of price effects). Rather,
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there has been a strong political incentive to prevent consumer prices from
rising, and to prevent producing companies from receiving large profits from
price increases. In effect, a major goal of our natural gas policy has been
distributional in nature; politicians are reluctant to pass legislation that
would redistribute income from gas consumers to gas producers. With this in
mind, let us consider what might happen to natural gas prices under alternative
policies.
There are three policies that must be considered, since these have pro-
vided the basis for most recent public debate over natural gas regulation. The
first.is simply a continuation of current FPC National area rates (under the
assumption that the FPC does not by itself change this pricing policy). New
contract prices would increase by 4 per year from the 1977 level of $1.46.
As old contracts expired, average wellhead prices for gas sold on interstate
markets would rise, but would remain will below new contract prices for. several
years, only reaching about 87¢ per mcf in 1980. Average wholesale prices (i.e.
prices charged by the pipelines to public utilities and large "mainline".in-
dustrial consumers) would depend on the particular distribution of gas through
the pipeline network and the cost of transmission, which in turn would depend
on changing patterns of regional demand. Although we can not know what these
prices will be with certainty, we can predict their likely values using our econo-
metric model of the natural gas industry. We can expect these prices to average
about 98¢ in 1978, and $1.16 in 1980. Similarly, based on projected demands and
projected interstate supplies, we can project that intrastate wellhead prices
would reach $2.00 in 1978 and $2.40 in 1980. To project retail prices, we as-
sume that the 1976 average retail to wholesale markup remains constant in real
terms on an mcf basis; we then extrapolate the markup assuming a 6 1/2% rate
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of inflation. Based on these markups, we estimate that in 1980. average residen-
tial retail price would reach $2.83, while the average industrial retail price
will reach $1.92. (There will be considerable regional variation in these
prices, however.)
A second alternative policy is that laid out in President Carter's National
Energy Plan. The main aspects of that plan that deal with natural gas are as
follows:
(a) The new contract price for "new" gas would be set equal to the
BTU equivalent of the average refiner acquisition price of all domestic
crude oil, while prices of "old" gas would continue to be limited to exist-
ing FPC National area rates. Based on projections of crude oil prices
under the Carter plan, we would expect the price of "new" gas to begin
10
at $1.75 per mcf and rise to $2.40 in 1980 and $3.10 in in 1985. We
7This markup is regulated by state regulatory commissions, and is usually based
on an allowed rate of return on undepreciated capital. Unless there are
major changes in supply, capital requirements are not likely to change much in
the future. Assuming that labor costs and nominal interest rates reflect the
aggregate rate of inflation, it seems reasonable to assume that the markup will
remain constant in real terms, as it more or less has in the past.
As an alternative means of forecasting retail prices, we fit a regression
equation relating retail prices to average wellhead prices over data from 1960
to 1976. For the residential retail price, the resulting regression equation
is: P = 0.7224 + 2.1218P , = .984 (Standard errors in parentheses.)
r w
(.40419) (.1359)
For the industrial retail price, our equation is:
P. = 0.0421 + 2.0722P ,R2 = .999
(.0123) (.0399) w
With these equations, retail prices would be somewhat higher in 1980 and 1985.
For example, in 1980, the residential retail price could range from $2.57 to
$3.48 under the alternative policies, while the industrial price could range from
$1.84 to $2.74.
8 See The National Energy Plan, Executive Office of the President, April 1977.
9
"New" gas includes new discoveries "from onshore wells more than 2 1/2 miles
from an existing well, or 1000 feet deeper than any existing well within a 2 1/2
mile radius," and offshore gas "produced from wells on new Federal leases granted
on or after April 20, 1977, or old leases which had been abandoned and are sub-
ject to re-leasing," Ibid, page 53.
1 0These prices are in nominal (undeflated) terms, and based on an assumed 6.5%
rate of general inflation.
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would also expect "new" gas to account for only about 25% of all new
contracts in 1978, but nearly 100% of all new contracts by 1981. As a
result, the average new contract price on interstate sales would be about
$1.58 in 1978, and $2.20 in 1980.
(b) New contract prices for intrastate gas' would also be regu-
lated. All new contracts of intrastate gas (both "old" and "new" gas)
would be tied to the price of "new" interstate gas, i.e. would increase
from $1.75 initially to around $2.40 in 1980. Average wellhead prices
of intrastate gas would thus be below their free market levels, but only
for a few years, and not by very much (since the price of "new". gas will
rise as the average refiner acquisition price of domestic crude oil
rises over the next 5 years).
(c) Pricing policy would discourage the use of gas by industry
and electric utilities. The wellhead cost of higher-priced ("new")
gas would be allocated to residential rather than industrial users.
In addition, beginning in 1979 a tax would be levied on industrial
users of gas which would be keyed to the difference between the price
of gas and the BTU equivalent price of oil. This tax would increase
so that on an mcf basis, the effective industrial price of gas would
be $1.05 below the BTU equivalent price of oil in 1979, and equal to
the BTU equivalent price of oil in 1985 and beyond. Based on pro-
jections of oil prices, we estimate that this tax would increase from
about 25¢ per mcf in 1979 to about $1.00 per mcf in 1985. Based
on our projections of average wellhead prices and average wholesale
prices under the Carter plan, we estimate that the average retail in-
dustrial price of gas (including the tax) would be about $2.39 in 1980
and $4.07 in 1985. Despite the tax and allocation of higher-priced gas
to industrial users, residential retail prices would still be higher
because of the relatively high cost of retail distribution to residential
consumers: $2.93 in 1980 and $4.31 in 1985.13
1 1Fact sheet on President's energy program issued by White House Energy Staff,
and "The National Energy Plan."
Obtained using our econometric model.
These retail prices are again based on the markup forecasts described earlier.
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The third alternative policy is designed to increase the new contract price
of all gas towards its free market level over the next five years. This would
provide a greater incentive to producers to increase supplies of gas, by exploring
for new discoveries (thus increasing reserves of "newi' gas), by exploring near
and extending existing reservoirs (thus increasing reserves of "old" gas), and
by increasing production from higher-cost reserves (that would otherwise be un-
economical). Our policy would raise the new.contract price in steps, to $2.00
in 1978, $2.40 in 1979, $2.55 in 1980, $2.70 in 1981, with further increases of
about 20¢ per year (to keep pace with general inflation). As a result of this poli-
cy, average interstate wellhead prices would rise to.80¢ in 1978, $1..30 in-1980, and
$2.21 in 1985, while new contract intrastate wellhead prices would rise to
$2.55 in 1980, and $3.50 in 1985. Using our econometric model, we project average
wholesale prices to be $1.06 in 1978, $1.53 in 1980, and $2.32 in 1985. Finally,
average residential retail prices would be $2.53 in 1978, $3.20 in 1980, and
$4.61 in 1985, while industrial retail prices would be $1.73, $2.29, and $3.36
in the respective years.
These price projections, together with recent actual.prices, are summarized
in Table 1. Because there is so much regional variation in retail prices, the
table also-shows projections of residential and industrial retail prices for dif-
ferent regions of the country.
Observe that although the different policies would have very different im-
plications for new contract prices (particularly in later years), in terms of per-
centage differences, the impact on retail prices is much smaller. For example,
in 1985 new contract interstate prices under "Phased Deregulation" would be
about double those under "FPC Area Rates." Average residential retail prices,
however, would only be about 22% higher. The reason is that the largest compo-
nent of the residential retail price is the cost of local transmission and
distribution, and this cost would not change as wellhead and wholesale prices
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increased. The percentage increase in industrial retail prices would be larger;
by 1985 "Phased Deregulation" would result in prices 33% higher than under con-
tinued FPC area rates, while the "Carter Plan" would result in prices 61%
higher (largely because of the tax on industrial use of gas). Finally, note
that there has been, and is likely to continue to be, considerable regional
variation in retail prices. Part of this variation is due to the differences
in interstate transmission costs, and part is due to differences in local dis-
tribution costs.
There is no doubt that our three alternative policies imply significant
differences in retail prices of gas to residential and industrial consumers.
The relevant question, however, is what is the total cost to consumers of a
higher-priced policy, and how does it compare to the cost of shortages resulting
from a lower-price policy? We will answer this question in Section 4, after
first projecting the shortages that are likely to result under the alternative
policies.
3. What is at Stake - Shortages
Our vehicle for predicting shortages under alternative policies is the
M.I.T. econometric model of the natural gas industry. This model explains in
detail the simultaneous behavior and interaction of natural gas and oil exploration
and reserve accumulation, natural gas production out of reserves, natural gas
distribution, and finally, natural gas demand.. It is therefore ideally suited
for forecasting the effects of alternative price policies. The model is described
in detail elsewhere, but we summarize its overall structure in the Appendix.1 4
The model was constructed by P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck, and various versions
are described in P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck, "Alternative Regulatory Policies
for Dealing with the Natural Gas Shortage," The Bell Journal of Economics and
Management Science, Vol. 4, No.2, Autumn 1973, P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck,
The Economics of the Natural Gas Shortage (1960-1980), North-Holland Pub. Co.,
Amsterdam, 1975, and P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck, Price Controls and the
Natural Gas Shortage, American Enterprise Institute, Wash. 1975. In 1976 the
model was structurally revised and re-estimated using an updated data base. The
most recent version of the model is described in R.S. Pindyck, "Higher Energy
Prices and the Supply of Natural Gas," Energy Systems and Policy, Autumn 1977.
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The three policies of interest to us were described in the last section in
the context of their implications for wellhead, wholesale, and retail prices.
We review them here, with reference to their simulation using the econometric
model:
(1) FPC area rates. New contract prices of gas are increased by 4¢
per year from $1.46 in 1977. Intrastate prices range from $2.00 in 1978
to $2.40 in 1980, and remain constant in real terms thereafter.
(2) Carter Plan. "New" gas prices, which rise from $1.75 to $2.40
in 1980, are the relevant new contract prices for determining exploratory
drilling and new discoveries, while "old" gas prices, the same as those in
(1) above, are the relevant new contract prices for determining extensions
and revisions of gas reserves. Average new contract prices (which determine
average wellhead and average wholesale prices) are calculated by assuming
that the fraction of "new" gas in new contracts rises from 25% in 1978
to 100% in 1981. Intrastate prices begin at $1.80 in 1978, but reach
$2.40 by 1980. Finally, a tax is added to the wholesale price of gas
facing industrial consumers. This tax ranges from 25¢ per mcf in 1979
to $1.00 in 1985.
(3) "Phased Deregulation." In this policy a set of new contract prices
is chosen that results in shortages dropping to about 3 Tcf. (Thus we can
not claim that exactly these prices would result from actual deregulation.)
Such a shortfall would be small enough to be filled by manufactured gas and
LNG imports. New contract prices are increased to $2.00 in 1978, $2.40
in 1979, $2.55 in 1980, $2.70 in 1981, and by 20¢ per year thereafter.
Intrastate new contract prices are assumed to equal those for interstate
gas from 1978 onwards.
The econometric model contains a number of exogenous variables for which
assumptions must be made in order to generate forecasts. With the exception of
oil prices, our assumptions about these variables are the same for all three
policies. The exogenous determinants of the reserves and production of gas in-.
clude the field price of crude oil in the producing regions, average drilling
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costs, interest rates, the amount of offshore acreage leased by the Bureau of
Land Management each year, and the number of drilling rigs operating offshore.
We assume that crude oil prices increase in nominal terms by $1.00 per year from
a base of $8.00 in 1977. (In simulating the Carter Plan we add the tax to the
wholesale price of refined oil products used in the industrial sector.) We assume
that average drilling costs increase in nominal terms by 10% annually, that
interest rates remain constant at 10%, that 2 million acres of offshore lands
are leased annually, and that five additional drilling rigs are installed each
year in offshore Louisiana. Determinants of demand include state-by-state per-
sonal income, value added in manufacturing, new capital expenditures in
manufacturing, population, and prices of alternative fuels. We assume that income,
value added, and capital expenditures all grow in real terms at a rate of 6% in
1976, 5% in 1977, 4% in 1978 and 79, and 3.5% thereafter. Prices of coal and elec-
tricity are projected to rise in real terms by 6% per year. Finally, we assume
that 1 Tcf of gas will be imported from Canada each year, and we include this
Canadian gas in our supply forecasts.
The results of our forecasts are shown in Tables 2, 3, and 4, and in. Figures
1, 2, 3, and 4. Observe that under a continuation of FPC area rates, production
of gas will fall off steadily, demand for gas will rise rapidly, and excess demand
will exceed 11 Tcf by 1980 and 20 Tcf by 1984. Part of this excess. demand (prob-
ably about half) will take the form of curtailments, while the remainder will
take the form of residential consumers unable to install new gas lines in homes,
·and industrial consumers unable to contract for gas deliveries.. -The first compo-
nent of excess demand (curtailments) will result (as it did. during the winter of
1976-77) in unemployment and lost GNP, and, as excess demand grows, cutoffs in
residential deliveries. The second component of excess demand (consumers unable to
contract for purchases) will result in an increased demand for oil and coal, as
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Figure 1 - Total Demand for Gas
1980 1998w
(a) FPC area rates (b) Carter (c) Deregulation
Figure 2 - Supply of Gas
1980 . 1985
(a) FPC area rates
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Figure 3 - Excess Demand for Gas.
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(b) Carter
1985
(c) Deregulation
Figure 4 - Reserves of Natural Gas
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consumers are forced to look for alternative fuels. This in turn will drive up
the prices of those fuels, or, if those prices are regulated, result in greater
imports of oil.
The Carter Plan would help considerably in reducing excess demand. It
would have its effect largely by reducing the demand for natural gas. Since
industrial consumers account for the majority of total gas demands, and since they
have a higher elasticity of demand, the imposition of.a tax on those consumers
would cause a major shift to alternative fuels, as well as some decrease in
total energy consumption. Under the Carter Plan, total demand for gas would
decrease by about 10% over the next nine years, whereas it would increase by
about 30% if current FPC area rates are maintained. Unfortunately, the Carter
Plan would not succeed in bringing forth significant new supplies of gas. Well-
head prices would rise only slowly, and producers would have little incentive
to do additional exploratory drilling, or to extend existing pools and reservoirs.
The net result would be an increase in excess demand to a peak of 9 Tcf by 1980,
and then a slow decrease to about 7 Tcf in 1985. While this scenario is far
preferable to the first, it would still result in significant shortages.
Excess demand can be reduced to about 3 Tcf per year if new contract well-
head prices are increased in steps according to our "Phased Deregulation" scenario.
This would result first in additional exploratory and development well drilling
so that new discoveries and reserve extensions would be larger, and second in
additional production out of any given level of proved reserves. Total pro-
duction of gas would be about 4 or 5 Tcf higher than under the Carter Plan,
while total demand for gas would be about the same as under the Carter Plan. But
by increasing supplies as well as decreasing demands, shortages could be averted.
These forecasts set forth the trade-off between higher prices and shortages.
Evaluating the alternative policies, however, requires estimating the dollar cost
-19-
of higher prices and the dollar cost of a shortage. .We now turn to the calculation
of these costs, and their use in assessing the policies.
4. The Cost of Higher Prices and the Cost of Shortages
We begin by estimating the cost of higher prices. This cost is just the
resulting increase in expenditures for those consumers able to obtain gas at
the lower price. Since the highest price would result from our policy of
"Phased Deregulation," we calculate the cost of higher prices for.this policy
relative to continued FPC area rates, and relative to the "Carter Plan." These
costs are calculated for the residential/commercial and industrial sectors
for each of nine regions and for each year over the period 1977-1985, based on
projected gas production and retail prices under each alternative policy. By
summing these costs across regions and over the 9 year horizon, we can compare
policies in terms of the relative cost to the U.S. of higher prices.
The costs of higher prices are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Each.number in
Table 5 represents, for consumers in a particular region and in a particular
year, the cost of higher prices resulting from a policy of "Phased Deregulation"
replacing a policy of "FPC Area Rates." (Table 6 represents the same costs for
"Phased Deregulation" replacing the "Carter.Plan.") Thus. we see, for example,
that a shift to "Phased Deregulation" will cost consumers in New England an
additional $108 million in 1980 and an additional $143 million in 1985. For the
U.S. as a whole, the corresponding costs would be $6.45 billion in 1980 and
$8.52 billion in 1985, of which a little more than half .would be incurred by
industrial consumers.
Summing over all nine years'in Table 5, we see that the total cost to.U.S..
consumers from higher prices resulting from "Phased Deregulation".(as opposed to
Note that this is not the change in consumer surplus resulting from a price. in-.
crease. The net loss in consumer surplus resulting from-aprice increase would
be smaller than this increased expenditure because of the gain.in surplus to
those consumers now able to obtain gas who were unable to before. We measure
this second component of consumer surplus, however, when we evaluate the cost of
a shortage.
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Table 5 - Cst of Higher Prices: Phased
Deregulation Relative to FPC Area Rates
Deregulation Relative to FPC Area Rates
Year
Region 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
New England .012 .027 .068 .108 .133 .141 .138 .143 .143
Middle Atlantic .072 .176 .425 .679 .836 .879 .869 .893 .899
East No. Central .177 .433 1.049 1.675 2.062 2.171 2.144 2.204 2.218
West No. Central .076 .183 .444 .708 .871 .918 .905 .931 .937
South Atlantic .054 .131 .319 .510 .627 .660 .652 .670 .674
East So. Central .037 .091 .220 .352 .432 .456 .450 .463 .466
West So. Central .130 .317 .768 1.227 1.509 1.589 1.569 1.613 1.622
Mountain .042 .105 .252 .404 .496 .523 .516 .531 .533
Pacific .082 .198 .486 .776 .954 1.005 .991 1.020 1.026
U.S. Total .678 1.664 4.034 6.452 7.929 8.347 8.239 8.475 8.524
Residential/Residential! - .317 .778 1.886 3.012 3.707 3.902 3.852 3.962 3.985Commercial
Industrial .361 .886 2.148 3.431 4.222 .445 14.387 4.513 4.539
* - All numbers are in billions of 1976 dollars.
Table 6 - Cost of Higher Prices: Phased
Deregulation Relative to the Carter Plan
Year 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Region
New England .012 .027 .036 .053 .056 .053 .030 .022 .013
Middle Atlantic .071 .175 .174 .264 .264 .246 .081 .021 (.044)
East No. Central .175 .432 .319 .507 .476 .437 -(.026) (.194) (.371)
West No. Central .075 .182 .087 .137 .108 .093 (.131) (.213) (.297)
South Atlantic .053 .131 .038 .075 .051 .040 (.131) (.193) (.257)
East So. Central .037 .090 .015 .038 .016 .010 (.113) (.158) (.203)
West So. Central .128 .315 (.097) (.069) (.187) (.198) (.703) (.888) (1.072)
Mountain .042 .103 .032 .062 .043 .036 (.098) (.147) (.197)
Pacific .082 .200 .110 .184 .159 .143 (.091) (.175) (.264)
U.S. Total .676 1.658 .705 1.253 .986 .862 (1.179) (1.922) (2.691)
Residential/Residential! .316 .775 1.520 2.168 2.387 2.266 1.912 1.786 1.623
Commercial
Industrial .360 .883 (.815) (.915) (1.401) (1.404) (3.091) (3.708) (4.314)
Tax Revenue Under 0 0 3.088 4.413 5.671 6.756 7.748 8.713 9.638Carter Plan
* - All numbers
lower retail
are in billions of 1976 dollars. Numbers in parentheses indicate
L prices under "Phased Deregulation."
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FPC area rates) would be $54.34 billion. Similarly, by summing over the nine
years in Table 6, we see that "Phased Deregulation" would cost consumers an
additional $0.35 billion in higher prices as compared to the Carter plan.. The
reason for this small cost, however, is that industrial. consumers actually pay
much more (in later years) under the Carter plan because-of the tax. The tax
revenues themselves add up to $46.03 billion over the nine years. Since these
tax revenues are available for public consumption (and in fact may be in part
rebated to taxpayers), they should be subtracted from the cost of higher prices
under the Carter plan - or, equivalently, added to the cost of "Phased Deregula-
tion." Adding in these tax revenues, we find that the total cost of "Phased De-
regulation" relative to the Carter plan is $46.38 billion.
These costs must now be compared to the costs of shortages resulting from
lower price policies. There are three components to the cost of a shortage:
(1) Some consumers are unable to obtain gas. There is thus
a direct loss of consumer surplus, measured as the value to
these consumers of the gas they otherwise would have pur-
chased.
(2) The shortage of natural gas results in increased demand for
other fuels (oil and coal), raising the prices of those
fuels to all consumers.l7
(3) Curtailments of gas result in unemployment.and thus lost
GNP.
We estimate each of these components of the cost of shortages, again comparing
FPC area rates and the Carter plan to "Phased Deregulation."
We begin with the direct loss of consumer surplus. This is given by the
shaded area in Figure 5. P and Q correspond to the free market price at which
there is no shortage, while P1 is the regulated price at which only Q1 is pro-
16
1We could have computed this cost by summing over a longer time horizon, but there
is too much uncertainty over-natural gas supply and demand after 1985 to make
such a calculation meaningful.
We have made the assumption that in the short term, consumers of gas switch to oil
and coal only if they are unable to purchase gas (i.e. the effective price of gas
to them is infinite), but not if the price of gas increases. This assumption
of near zero cross-price elasticity in the short term was necessary since we do
not have a complete econometric model of inter-fuel substitution.
-22-
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Figure 5 - Lost Consumer Surplus from a Shortage
duced. The demand function itself is needed to compute this lost surplus, since
it determines the value of the quantity difference Qo - Q1 We use aggregate
residential and aggregate industrial demand functions obtained from our econometric
model of the natural gas industry, based on a five year adjustment period,
The calculated surplus losses corresponding to lower price policies are shown
in Table 7. Note that the total consumer surplus "benefit" is about $11.8 billion
when "Phased Deregulation" is compared to FPC area rates, and $8.6 billion when
it is compared to the Carter plan.
Next we measure the cost of shortage-induced expenditures on oil and coal.
To obtain a conservative estimate of this cost, we assume that only half of
the excess demand for natural gas is satisfied (on a BTU equivalent basis) by
oil and coal. Further we assume that at 1976 prices, the long-run price elas-
ticities for oil and coal demand and supply are -0.5 and 0.4 respectively.1 8
1 8The actual elasticities are probably smaller, and the use of larger elasti-
cities will give us an underestimate of the induced expenditure on oil and
coal. Again, we choose the larger elasticities in order to obtain as conser-
vative an estimate of the induced expenditure as possible.
A
-Y 
.W
Ig
it\
4~~~~
I
1 3
-23-
S,
\ /
Figure 6 - Shortage-Induced Expenditure on Oil and Coal
The induced expenditure on oil and gas is given by the shaded area in Figure 6,
where S and D are the aggregate supply. and demand curves for both oil and
coal, and X is the additional demand for oil and coal (i.e. one-half of the
BTU shortage of natural gas). Note that the increased expenditure on oil and
coal comes about for two reasons: a larger quantity is consumed, and the shift
in demand causes the price to rise.
The calculated increases in oil and coal expenditures are shown in Table
8. Note that these increased expenditures are quite large, and in the case of
"Phased Deregulation" relative to FPC area rates, the expenditure by itself out-
weighs the cost of higher prices.
Finally we measure the lost GNP that would result from shortages. To do this,
we begin with an estimate prepared by the American Gas Association of the added
unemployment resulting from natural gas shortages during the winter of 1976-77.l9
The A.G.A. found the following unemployment to be directly attributable to the
shortage:
1 9
"Economic Impact of Winter 1976-77," Statistics Directorate, American Gas As-
sociation, May 10, 1977. These estimates are quite close to those issued by
private economic forecasting firms.
0
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Table 7 - Consumer Surplus Losses from Shortages
L984 L985 
TOTAL
1977
Residential
FPC Area /Commercial
Rates
Relative Industrial
to Phased
Deregula-
tion Total
Residential
Carter /Commercial
Plan
Relative to
Phased Industrial
Deregula-
tion
Total
6.480
5.361
11.841
4.723
3.900
8.623
* - All numbers are in billions of 1976 dollars.
Table 8 - Shortage-Induced Expenditures on Oil and Coal
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 TOTAL
FPC Area Rates
Relative to Phased 0.378 1.232 2.946 6.084 9.610 12.414 14.785 16.816 18.786 83.051
Deregulation
Carter Plan Rela- 0.472 1.327 1.801 3.688 5.279 5.646 5.172 4.044 2.728 30.157
tive to Phased
Deregulation
* - All numbers are in billions of 1976 dollars.
.002
.002
.004
.004
.003
.007
k
1978
.013
.010
.023
.017
.013
.030
1979
.080
.064
.144
.090
.072
.162
L980
.382
.311
.693
.446
.363
.809
L981
.932
.768
1.700
.965
.795
1 76(
1982
1.296
1.073
2.369
1.113
.921
2.034
T-
L983
1.381
1.145
2.526
.975
.809
1.784
1.284
1.066
2.350
.700
.581
1.281
1.110
.922
2.032
.413
.343
.756
- - 1 II !
1985 TOTAL
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Date Number Unemployed
Jan. 11 0
26 240,000
27 650,'000
28 840,000
Feb. 4 1,212,000
8 870,600
12 532,000
18 218,000
26 92,500
March 4 65,400
14 10,000
We convert this unemployment into an average increase in the unemployment
rate on an annual basis, which we find to be 0.093%. We attribute this increase
in the unemployment rate to the year 1976, for which we have estimated the natural
gas shortage to be 5.9 Tcf. We now assume that changes in the size of the gas
shortage (as measured by our econometric model) will result in proportional
changes in the induced increase in the unemployment rate, so that our projections
of future shortages under alternative regulatory policies can be used to project
induced unemployment. Next, we obtain the cost of this unemployment in terms
of los GNP by using Okun's Law, which says that a 1% increase in the unemploy-
ment rate corresponds to approximately a 3% loss of "potential GNP."2 0 Finally,
we assume that potential GNP grows in real terms by 3.5% annually from its
1976 value of $1692.4 billion.
Our alternative policies are compared in terms of relative shortage-induced
unemployment and corresponding lost GNP in Table 9. By summing the lost GNP
over the nine years 1977-1985, we obtain the third component of the cost of
shortages.
The cost of higher prices and the costs of shortages are summarized in Table
10. Observe that in comparing "Phased Deregulation" to continued FPC area rates
2 0For a recent empirical estimate of Okun's Law, see G.L. Perry, "Potential
Output and Productivity," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1977:1.
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Table 9 - Shortage-Induced Unemployment and Lost GNP
Increase in
average un-
FPC employment
Area rate over
Rates year
Relative
to Phased Lost GNP
Deregu-
lation
Increase in
average un-
Carter employment
Plan rate over
Relative year
to Phased
Deregu- Lost GNP
lation
1977
.0063
0.33
.0078
0.41
1978
.0205
1.11
.0221
1.20
L979
.0490
2.76
.0300
1.69
L980
.1011
5.89
.0616
3.59
1981
.1280
7.72
.0885
5.34
1982
.2054
12.82
.0948
5.92
L983
.2433
15.72
.0869
5.61
L984
.2749
18.38
.0995
6.65
.985
3049
21.10
.0458
3.17
rototal
85.86
33.58
* - Measured in billions of 1976 dollars.
Table 10 - Cost Comparisons of Alternative Policies
Cost Costs of Shortages Total
of
Lost consumer Induced Ex- Cost
surplus penditure on Lost GNP (Benefit)
prices oil and coal
"Phased Deregulation"
"Phased Deregulation" 54.34 (11.84) (83.05) (85.86) (126.41)VS.
"FPC Area Rates"
"Phased Deregulation"
vs. 46.38 (8.62) (30.16) (33.58) (25.98)
"Carter Plan"
1 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . ... . I_ --
* - All costs summed over 1977-1985, and measured in billions
of 1976 dollars.
_ _~~~~~~~
II 1 I I I
I
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or to the Carter plan, the cost of shortages resulting from the lower price policy
outweighs the cost of higher prices. "Phased Deregulation" is clearly a far
superior policy to continued FPC area rates; over the nine-year period the cost
of higher prices totals about $54 billion, while the cost of shortages is over
$180 billion. By taxing industrial use of gas and providing a somewhat higher
price for "new" gas, the Carter plan will significantly ameliorate shortages,
the shortages still resulting would be more costly than the higher prices of
"Phased Deregulation." We find "Phased Deregulation" to have a total benefit
over the Carter plan of about $26 billion over the nine year period, and this is
a highly conservative estimate, since we have taken the entire tax revenue
under the Carter plan and attributed it to consumers as a benefit. (Had we
included the tax revenue as a cost, the total benefit of "Phased Deregulation"
would be $72 billion.) There is thus a significant gain to be had by letting
natural gas prices rise towards free market levels, and thereby eliminating
shortages.
5. Revising Our Natural Gas Policy
A regulation-induced shortage only makes sense from the point of view of
total public welfare if the gain to consumers from lower prices exceeds the
losses created by the shortage. We have seen that in the case of natural gas,
continued regulation-induced shortages cannot be justified, since the cost of
these shortages would far outweigh the gain that some consumers would receive by
being able to pay lower prices.
We have, of course, ignored the question of which consumers would end up
paying higher prices under deregulation. There is no doubt that even a moderate
increase in the residential price of natural gas would result in an unacceptable
increase in the living expenses of some low-income consumers. But the use of energy
-28-
policy is the wrong way to achieve equity in income distribution and living
standards. Distributional goals can be better attained through the use of tax
and transfer policy. For example, expanding our existing food stamp program -
by increasing stamp allotments and allowing the stamps to be applied to heating
bills (or that portion of rent allocated to fuels) - would be an effective way
of buffering low-income groups from the effects of higher energy prices.
We have already incurred unnecessarily higher costs from the regulation-
induced shortage of natural gas. Hopefully, our energy policy in the future will
be guided by a better understanding of the trade-off between the cost of higher
prices and the costs of the shortages, distortions, and growing foreign depen-
dence that result from policies that attempt to maintain low prices.
2 1This proposal was presented in R.E. Hall and R.S. Pindyck, "The Conflicting Goals
of National Energy Policy," The Public Interest, Number 47, Spring 1977.
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APPENDIX - OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF THE
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
Our model of the natural gas industry simultaneously describes gas supplies
and demands in both the market for reserve additions (gas producers selling new
reserves to pipelines at the wellhead price) and the market for wholesale deli-
veries (pipelines selling gas on long-term contracts to retail utilities and in-
dustrial consumers). The model is highly disaggregated on a regional basis, and
describes in detail the spatial structure of the industry; reserve additions are
contracted for in regional field markets and gas production is delivered by pipe-
lines to regional wholesale markets, and these regional markets are interconnected
by the pipeline network. A block diagram of the model is shown in Figure A-1 that
ignores - for simplicity - the regional interconnections between production dis-
tricts and regional wholesale markets.
Equations for new discoveries of gas and oil are specified and estimated that
account for shifts in directionality (gas vs. oil) and for shifts between drilling
on the extensive (high-risk) and intensive (low-risk) margins in response to price
changes. New discoveries begin with the drilling of exploratory wells, of which
some will succeed in discovering gas, some will succeed in discovering oil (with
or without associated gas), and some will be unsuccessful. An equation predicting
the number of exploratory wells drilled is specified based on the assumption that
producers respond rationally to economic incentives as they form portfolios of
drilling ventures that may be extensive or intensive, or may favor gas or oil.
Economic incentives enter the equation through expected gas and oil revenue (the
product of expected prices, success ratios, and sizes of finds), expected risk
(an estimate of the variance of expected revenue), average drilling costs, and the
1For a detailed descritpion of the model, see P.W. MacAvoy and R.S. Pindyck, The
Economics of the Natural Gas Shortage (1960-1980), North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1975,
and R.S. Pindyck, "Higher Energy Prices and the Supply of Natural Gas," Energy
Systems and Policy, Fall 1977.
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FIGURE A-I
SIMPLIFIED BLOCK DIAGRAM OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
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interest rate (reflecting capital costs). Two equations then describe the frac-
tion of wells drilled that will succeed in finding gas, and the fraction that will
succeed in finding oil. Finally, two equations determine the size of discovery
per successful well for gas and oil respectively, and include the effects of price
changes and resource depletion. All of these equations were estimated for a set
of 20 FPC production districts. Thus new discoveries for gas and oil can be
determined on a regional basis as the product of number of wells, success ratio,
and size of find per successful well. This level of detail is needed given that
oil and natural gas are joint products that must be treated symmetrically.2
The model also contains a detailed description of reserve extensions and re-
visions. An equation is estimated that determines the total number of development
wells drilled in any year. (Development wells are drilled in preparation of produc-
ing gas or oil from a newly discovered field, and it is these wells, rather than
exploratory wells, that lead to extensions and revisions of reserves.) The num-
ber of development wells drilled depends on prices and on direct drilling costs,
capital costs, and existing reserve levels. Two equations then determine sizes
of finds for gas extensions and oil extensions. Explanatory variables in these
equations include price (which explain directionality), drilling costs (which
could induce operators to change drilling patterns and thereby alter the size
distribution of the resulting extensions), and an index that describes the pro-
cess of geological depletion. Extensions of gas and oil are thus determined as the
product of development wells and sizes of finds of extensions. Revisions on the
If higher prices in fact shift exploratory effort to the extensive margin, one
would have.certain a priori expectations regarding the signs of the coefficients
of price terms in the success ratio and size of find equations. Estimation of
the latest version of the model gives no evidence of clear-cut shifts toward the
extensive or intensive margin in response to price increases. Much of the vari-
ation in success ratios, for example, was found not to be caused by changes in price
but rather by regional differences and depletion effects. Although the size of
find for gas does show a clear positive dependence on the price of gas, the size of
find for oil shows no dependence. Thus the impact of changes in price on new dis-
coveries occurs largely through the level of exploratory activity.
-32-
other hand do not depend on well drilling, but instead are functions of price,
prior reserve and production levels, and changes in production.
Year-end reserves of gas in any year are equal to reserves in the' previous
year plus additions to reserves (the sum of discoveries, extensions, and revisions)
minus production of gas. Production out.of reserves depends on the size of the re-
serve base and on prices that buyers are willing to pay for increasd deliveries.
In our model production supply is based on marginal cost pricing, i.e. the marginal
cost of developing existing reserves determines a particular level of annual flow,
and as the reserve-production ratio becomes smaller, marginal costs rise sharply.
Also, there are critical reserve-production ratios below which marginal costs rise
extremely sharply. These critical levels could not be estimated econometrically
since they have not yet been reached (at least on an aggregate level), but in the
model we use engineering estimates to introduce them explicitly.. Thus, given some
level of year-end reserves in any one production district, the level of gas pro-
duction in that district will increase with price, but only insofar as the reserve-
production ratio stays above a minumum level.
The discovery and production of offshore natural gas is particularly impor-
tant in policy evaluation, since as both gas and oil prices increase and as more
offshore acreage is leased by the federal government, offshore fields will probably
provide an increasing share of gas production. The model therefore contains a com-
plete offshore "sub-model" that relates reserves and production of gas off the coast
of Louisiana to such policy variables as the new contract field price and the
amount of acreage leased annually, and to exogenous variables such.as interest rates,
the price of oil, and the number of drilling rigs operating offshore. The sub-
model operates through three interacting blocks of equations that determine total
acreage, producing acreage, and reserves additions and production.
The wholesale demand for natural gas is a function of the wholesale price,
as well as prices of alternative fuels and "market size" variables such as pop-
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ulation, income, and investment. Average wholesale prices for gas are computed
in the model for each consumption region in the country through a series of pipe-
line price markup equations, which are based on operating costs, capital costs,
and regulated rates of profit for the pipeline companies. Finally, the distribu-
tion of natural gas is determined from a regional input-output table connecting
production districts with consuming regions.
